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Abstract
We review the status of Bell’s inequalities in quantum information,
stressing mainly the links with quantum key distribution and distillation
of entanglement. We also prove that for all the eavesdropping attacks
using one qubit, and for a family of attacks of two qubits, acting on
half of a maximally entangled state of two qubits, the violation of a Bell
inequality implies the possibility of an efficient secret-key extraction.
1 Introduction
Quantum correlations were noticed to be astonishing by Einstein-Podolski-
Rosen [1] and by Schro¨dinger [2] back in 1935. In particular, the EPR paper
stressed that the predicted correlations could not be explained by exchange of a
signal, since the entangled particles could be at an arbitrary distance from one
another. If signal exchange is excluded, in the classical world we know only an-
other mechanism to establish correlations: common preparation at the source.
This second possibility was ruled out by John Bell in 1964 [3]: the predicted
quantum correlations violate a condition (“Bell’s inequality”, BI) that should
hold if the correlations were established at the preparation. All the experiments
performed since the Aspect experiment [4] in 1982 confirm quantum physics.
Nowadays, although one should not forget the detection and locality loop-
hole until their joint experimental test [5], for most physicists the debate on
quantum correlations is closed: entanglement does exist, and moreover it has
been recognized as a resource needed to perform tasks that would be classically
impossible [6]. While nobody doubts that the interpretational content of the BI
should shape any physicist’s view of the world, it is not clear whether BI can
be of interest for quantum information processing. We have investigated this
question, since we believe that deep concepts and clever applications should not
become two separate domains.
This paper contains two separate sections: in section 2, we review the status
of the Bell’s inequalities in quantum information; in section 3, we present a
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generalization of the link [7] between violation of Bell’s inequalities and security
of the quantum key distribution with qubits.
2 The status of Bell’s inequalities in quantum
information
2.1 BI and quantum cryptography
The goal of quantum cryptography (quantum key distribution, QKD) is to pro-
vide Alice and Bob with a secret key. An important result of classical cryptog-
raphy says that if
I(A : B) > min[I(A : E), I(B : E)] (1)
where I(X : Y ) is the mutual information between X and Y , then a secret key
can be extracted from the classical data (obtained by measuring the quantum
systems) by efficient protocols using only one-way communication [8]. If that
condition does not hold, in some cases a secret key can still be extracted, but
all the known protocols are very inefficient.
Consider QKD with entangled particles [9], and let us start with the standard
setting with two partners. Alice prepares the maximally entangled state, keeps
one particle and sends the other one to Bob. In the absence of any spy on the
line, whenever Alice and Bob measure in the same basis they obtain perfectly
correlated random results. If the eavesdropper Eve has her own particles interact
with the particle flying to Bob, the quantum state |ΨABE〉 becomes shared
among the three actors, and the quantum information shared by Alice and Bob
is given by the mixed state ρAB obtained by tracing out Eve’s system. The
connection with BI is as follows: in all the studied protocols, considering Eve’s
optimal individual attack, if ρAB violates a Bell’s inequality, then (1) holds.
This link was first noticed for the four-state protocol with qubits [7], in which
case actually the violation of the CHSH inequality is also a necessary condition
for (1) to hold. In section 3 we generalize this result. Protocols using higher-
dimensional systems and/or more bases have also been studied, and in all these
cases the condition seems only to be sufficient [10].
A different extension has also been studied: the extension to protocols in-
volving more than two partners. In such “quantum secret-sharing” protocols,
Alice distributes random bits to N Bobs, that must cooperate in order to re-
trieve the key. For protocols using qubits and two conjugated bases, it was also
found [11] that a condition similar to (1) holds if and only if the Mermin-Klyshko
inequalities are violated.
2.2 BI and distillation of entanglement
Distillation of entanglement is a fundamental quantum information process.
The entanglement of a quantum state ρ is distillable if, out of many copies
of it, one can extract maximally entangled states (two-qubit singlets) using
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only local operations and classical communication (LOCC). Operationally, this
means the following: if a source S produces a state which is weakly entangled
but distillable, then one can build a new source S ′, that is less efficient but
produces strongly entangled states, by simply appending local devices to the
ports of S and allowing the partners to communicate. In other words, if we
have S, then we can build S ′ and run any quantum information protocol like
teleportation. The notion of distillability is not trivial because, in all quantum
composed systems but C
2 ⊗ C 2 and C 2 ⊗ C 3, there exist so-called bound-
entangled states, that are entangled but not distillable.
We studied the link with BI in quantum systems composed of N > 2 qubits.
In such a case, when the system is composed of more than two sub-systems,
the notion of distillability is not even univoque. The strongest requirement is
“full distillability”: any two partners can distill a singlet by LOCC. The weakest
requirement is “bipartite distillability”: the N partners split into two groups
of nA and nB = N − nA partners, and the state is distillable with respect to
this partition nA/nB. Within each group, the most general transformations are
allowed; but only classical communication is allowed between one group and the
other.
We have demonstrated [12] a quantitative link between this hierarchy or
degree of distillability and the amount of violation of the WWZB inequalities
[13], that are the linear correlation inequalities with two settings per site. If a N -
qubit state violates a WWZB inequality there is some distillable entanglement
in the state; moreover, the amount of the violation is associated to the degree
of distillability. In particular, a violation close to the maximal value, namely
〈BN 〉 ∈]2(N−2)/2, 2(N−1)/2], guarantees full distillability of the state. A similar
result holds for the Uffink inequality [14].
2.3 BI and communication complexity
A “communication complexity” problem is the problem of computing a function
whose inputs are distributed among several partners, who can exchange only a
limited amount of information. In the quantum version of such protocols, some
of the input information is replaced by quantum information, and the partners
can share an entangled state.
It has been shown in Ref. [15] that for every Bell’s inequality and for a broad
class of protocols, there always exists a multi-partite communication complexity
problem, for which the protocol assisted by states which violate the inequality
is more efficient than any classical protocol. Moreover, for that advantage, the
violation of the BI is a necessary and sufficient criterion.
3 CHSH and quantum key distribution with qubits
In this section we will show the link between Bell violation and the security of
QKD protocols for all one-qubit eavesdropping attacks and a family of two-qubit
attacks.
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Consider the situation in which Alice locally prepares a maximally entangled
state of two qubits, |Φ+〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2, and sends one of the qubits to
Bob by an insecure quantum channel. This qubit is intercepted by Eve, who
performs the following attack: (i) she adds a one-qubit ancillary system in the
state |E〉 and performs a unitary operation, UBE, over the two qubits and (ii)
forwards one of the output qubits to Bob. Giving Eve just one qubit may appear
as an exceedingly strong restriction; however, it is known that there exist a one-
qubit attack such that I(A : E) reaches the value of the optimal individual
eavesdropping on the BB84 protocol [16, 11]. We shall discuss below the role of
I(B : E).
After this attack, Alice, Bob and Eve share a three-qubit pure state, |ΨABE〉 ∈
HA⊗HB⊗HE . Note that this state has been obtained after interacting on half
of a maximally entangled state, so
|ΨABE〉 = (1A ⊗ UBE) 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉)⊗ |E〉. (2)
Eve’s unitary operation acting on the qubit going to Bob and her fixed ancillary
system spans a two-dimensional subspace of HB ⊗ HE . It was shown in Ref.
[16] that there exist local bases |0′〉, |1′〉 and |0〉, |1〉 for Bob and |0〉, |1〉 for Eve
such that
UBE|0′〉|E〉 = sinα|01〉+ cosα|10〉
UBE|1′〉|E〉 = cosβ|00〉+ sinβ|11〉, (3)
where 0 ≤ α, β ≤ pi/2. Using the fact that V ⊗ V ∗|Φ+〉 = |Φ+〉, ∀V ∈ SU(2),
we can take on Bob’s space the basis in the r.h.s. of Eq. (2) to be the same as in
the l.h.s. of Eq. (3). It follows that all the states (2) can be easily parametrized
as
|ΨABE〉 = 1√
2
(sinα|001〉+ cosα|010〉+ cosβ|100〉+ sinβ|111〉), (4)
i.e. they are completely specified by two angles, up to local unitary transforma-
tions.
The state shared by Alice and Bob is ρAB = TrE(|ΨABE〉〈ΨABE |). For any
two-qubit state, the maximal violation B of the CHSH inequality [17] reads
B =
√
λ21 + λ
2
2, where the local bound is put at one [18]. The λ1,2 are the
two largest (in modulus) eigenvalues of the 3× 3 correlation matrix R(ρ) whose
elements are (R(ρ))ij = Tr(σi⊗σj ρ) where i, j = 1, 2, 3 and σi denote the Pauli
matrices. For the state ρAB one finds
R(ρAB) =

 cos(α− β) 0 00 cos(α+ β) 0
0 0 − cos(α + β) cos(α− β)

 . (5)
Note that |Rxx| ≥ |Ryy| ≥ |Rzz |, whence B = (R2xx + R2yy)1/2 . After some
simple algebra one finds that
B > 1 ⇐⇒ 0 ≤ α, β ≤ pi
4
, or
pi
4
≤ α, β ≤ pi
2
. (6)
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Now, let us see how the state ρAB can be used for cryptography. The honest
partners measure in the local bases that are maximally correlated. That is (see
Eq. (5)), Alice and Bob both measure in the x basis. Their measurement results
are denoted by ±, and the corresponding states by |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)√2. Since
Alice’s state is completely random, pA(+) = pA(−) = 1/2. Although Bob’s
state is different from 1 /2, we also have that pB(+) = pB(−) = 1/2. Then
I(A : B) = Ib(Rxx) where Ib is the binary mutual entropy
Ib(x) = 1 +
1 + x
2
log
(
1 + x
2
)
+
1− x
2
log
(
1− x
2
)
. (7)
Note that when 0 ≤ x1, x2 ≤ 1, Ib(x1) ≥ Ib(x2)⇔ x1 ≥ x2.
Eve’s states, depending on Alice and Bob’s results, read:
|e˜++〉 = 1
2
√
2
((cosα+ cosβ)|0〉+ (sinα+ sinβ)|1〉)
|e˜+−〉 = 1
2
√
2
((− cosα+ cosβ)|0〉+ (sinα− sinβ)|1〉)
|e˜−+〉 = 1
2
√
2
((cosα− cosβ)|0〉+ (sinα− sinβ)|1〉)
|e˜−−〉 = 1
2
√
2
(−(cosα+ cosβ)|0〉+ (sinα+ sinβ)|1〉) , (8)
the norm of the states being the probability of any event, i.e. p (00) = p (11) =
(1+Rxx)/4 and p (01) = p (10) = (1−Rxx)/4. In the following, the tilde denotes
non-normalized states. If Eve wants to acquire information about Alice’s result,
she has to distinguish between the two states ρi = 2(|e˜i+〉〈e˜i+| + |e˜i−〉〈e˜i−|),
where i = +,−. In this case, the measurement maximizing her information is
known (actually, it also minimizes her error probability) [19], having I(A : E) =
Ib(sin(α+β)). Therefore, IAB ≥ IAE when Rxx = cos(α−β) ≥ sin(α+β), and
then
I(A : B) > I(A : E) ⇐⇒ B > 1. (9)
It is interesting to compute the information that Eve has about Bob’s symbol.
Using the same techniques as above for the states ρi = 2(|e˜+i〉〈e˜+i|+ |e˜−i〉〈e˜−i|)
where i = +,−, one can see that I(B : E) = Ib(sinα cosα + sinβ cosβ). Note
that I(A : B) > I(B : E) for all the values of α and β but β = pi/2 − α,
where the two quantities are equal [20]. This means that the honest partners
can apply a reverse reconciliation protocol, i.e. one-way error correction and
privacy amplification from Bob to Alice, ∀α, β, except for a set of attacks of
zero measure (β = pi/2− α). Eq. (9) can now be extended to
I(A : B) > max(I(A : E), I(B : E)) ⇐⇒ B > 1. (10)
The entanglement properties of ρAB also give more insight into this result,
since one can see that ρAB is entangled [21] for all the attacks (except when
β = pi/2 − α). Therefore none of the one-qubit attacks is able to disentangle
Alice and Bob.
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There is a standard way in which Eve can make her information about Alice
and Bob symmetric, simply using the same one-qubit attack, UBE(α, β), and
adding an extra ancillary qubit. This symmetric two-qubit attack is shown in
figure 1. The resulting state for Alice and Bob is Bell-diagonal [23] and has the
same correlations as above, i.e. the same R matrix (although ρAB has now full
rank, while above its rank was equal to 2). Therefore, the expression for the
CHSH violation and the information Alice-Bob has not changed. Concerning
Eve, some simple and patient algebra shows that her four two-qubit states are
|e˜++〉 = 1
2
√
2
((cosα+ cosβ)|0〉+ (sinα+ sinβ)|1〉)⊗ |+〉
|e˜+−〉 = 1
2
√
2
((− cosα+ cosβ)|0〉+ (sinα− sinβ)|1〉)⊗ |−〉
|e˜−+〉 = 1
2
√
2
((cosα− cosβ)|0〉+ (sinα− sinβ)|1〉)⊗ |−〉
|e˜−−〉 = 1
2
√
2
(−(cosα+ cosβ)|0〉+ (sinα+ sinβ)|1〉)⊗ |+〉, (11)
Now, it is easy to understand the role played by the second qubit. In the first
qubit we have the same information as above, so I(A : E) has not changed.
From the second qubit Eve knows in a deterministic way whether Alice and
Bob symbol coincide. This allows her to use the knowledge on Alice’s symbol
for guessing Bob’s, and she now has I(B : E) = I(A : E). Thus, for this family
of attacks
I(A : B) > min(I(A : E), I(B : E)) = I(A : E) = I(B : E) ⇐⇒ B > 1.
(12)
Since the present attack is symmetric, it is not important which of the honest
partners starts the one-way error correction and privacy amplification processes.
In conclusion: for all individual attacks with just one qubit, the link be-
tween sceurity and BI is given by (10). For the two qubit attacks built from the
one-qubit ones through the scheme of Fig. 1, the link is provided by (12). The
optimal individual eavesdropping on the BB84 protocol belongs to this family
of two-qubit attacks [7]. But we would like to stress here that our results are
independent of any considered protocol. Indeed, we have studied the relation
between Bell violation and security for a family of states obtained after eaves-
dropping on half of a maximally two-qubit entangled state. We have shown that
the violation of the CHSH guarantees the existence of projective measurements
whose results allow the honest partners to establish a key with efficiency [24].
As expected, these measurements are related to the bases that appear in the
violated CHSH inequality.
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Figure 1: General scheme for modifying the initial one-qubit attack, specified
by UBE(α, β), where I(A : B) ≥ I(B : E) and I(A : E) ≥ I(B : E), into a
symmetric two-qubit attack, where I(A : E) is the same but now I(B : E) =
I(A : E).
4 Conclusions
We have discussed the main connections between Bell’s inequalities and the
usefulness of entanglement in quantum information processing. In all the cases
that have been considered, a state that violates a Bell’s inequality is useful for
quantum information processing; in the case of cryptography, it even leads to
efficient (one-way) secret-key extraction. Bell’s inequalities appear as detectors
of “efficient entanglement”.
The precise link between entanglement, “useful” or “efficient” entanglement,
and non-locality remains however elusive, in spite of all these clarifications.
On the one hand, we are just now beginning to tackle in a fruitful way the
hard task of classifying all the Bell’s inequalities [25]. On the other hand, our
understanding of entanglement has been recently improved by a remarkable
result [26] by the Horodeckis and Oppenheim, who have shown that a secret
key can be extracted from some bound entangled states: ultimately, we may
discover that any form of entanglement is “useful” for something. This situation
promises still a lot of work to do for the future.
Acknowledgements
We enjoyed several collaborations and discussions on these topics with Daniel
Collins, Michael Wolf, Marek Z˙ukowski and Cˇaslav Brukner. This work has
been supported by the ESF, the Swiss NCCR “Quantum Photonics” and OFES
within the EU project RESQ (IST-2001-37559), the Spanish grant 2002FI-00373
UB and the Generalitat de Catalunya.
7
References
[1] A. Einstein, B. Podolsky and N. Rosen, Phys. Rev. 47 777 (1935).
[2] E. Schro¨dinger, Naturwissenschaften 23, 807 (1935).
[3] J. S. Bell, Physics 1 195 (1964).
[4] A. Aspect, P. Grangier and G. Roger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 47, 460 (1981).
[5] Both loopholes have been closed in separate experiments. But at present,
there has been no experiment closing the two loopholes simultaneously.
[6] H.K. Lo, S. Popescu, T.P. Spiller (eds), Introduction to Quantum computa-
tion and information (World Scientific, 1998).
[7] C. Fuchs, N. Gisin, R.B. Griffiths, C.-S. Niu, A. Peres, Phys. Rev. A 56,
1163 (1997).
[8] I. Csisza´r, J. Ko¨rner, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory IT-24, 339 (1978).
[9] A. K. Ekert, Phys. Rev. Lett. 67, 661 (1991).
[10] A. Ac´ın, N. Gisin, V. Scarani, Quant. Inf. Comput. 3, 563 (2003)
[11] V. Scarani and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 87, 117901 (2001); idem, Phys.
Rev. A 65, 012311 (2002).
[12] A. Ac´ın, V. Scarani, M.M. Wolf, Phys. Rev. A 66, 042323 (2002); idem, J.
Phys. A: Math. Gen. 36, L21 (2003).
[13] R. F. Werner and M. M. Wolf, Phys. Rev. A 64 032112 (2001); M. Z˙ukowski
and Cˇ. Brukner, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88 210401 (2002).
[14] J. Uffink, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 230406 (2002).
[15] Cˇ. Brukner, M. Z˙ukowski, A. Zeilinger, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89, 197901 (2002);
Cˇ. Brukner, M. Z˙ukowski, J.-W. Pan, A. Zeilinger, quant-ph/0210114.
[16] C.-S. Niu and R. B. Griffiths, Phys. Rev. A 60, 2764 (1999).
[17] J. F. Clauser, M. A. Horne, A. Shimony, R. A. Holt, Phys. Rev. Lett. 23
880 (1969).
[18] R. Horodecki, P. Horodecki and M. Horodecki, Phys. Lett. A 200, 340
(1995).
[19] A. Peres, Quantum Theory: Concepts and Methods (Kluwer, Dordrecht,
1998).
8
[20] This point was missed in the introductory paragraphs of Refs. [11]. The
mistake is found in eq. (5) of the Phys. Rev. A paper: DBE should read
1
2 (1− 12 sin 2φ). Fig.1 of both papers suffer of this mistake: actually, for the
one-qubit attack studied there, min(IAE , IBE) = IBE , which is in turn al-
ways smaller than IAB. The main results of these papers, concerning multi-
partners cryptography (where it is not even clear how “reverse reconcili-
ation” should be defined) are not invalidated; nor is the message of the
introduction, since, as we are going to show, the symmetry IAE = IBE is
recovered by giving Eve a second qubit.
[21] Since ρAB is a two-qubit state, its entanglement can be detected by the
non-positivity of the partial transposition, ρTAAB. The partial transposition,
that was introduced in Ref. [22], is defined as follows: consider an operator,
X , that acts on HA ⊗HB , where dA and dB denote the dimension of each
space. The partial trasposition of X with respect to the first subsystem, in
the basis {|1〉, . . . , |dA〉}, is given by XTA ≡
∑dA
i,j=1
∑dB
k,l=1 〈ik|O|jl〉|jk〉〈il|.
[22] A. Peres, Phys. Rev. Lett. 77 1413 (1996); M. Horodecki, P. Horodecki and
R. Horodecki, Phys. Lett. A 223 1 (1996).
[23] A state is said to be Bell diagonal when its eigenbasis is the Bell basis, i.e.
the four two-qubit maximally entangled states |Φ±〉 = (|00〉 ± |11〉)/√2 and
|Ψ±〉 = (|01〉 ± |10〉)/√2.
[24] Alice and Bob obtain the secret key by measuring always in the x basis.
However, Eve cannot pass unnoticed by using an intecept-resend strategy,
because under such an attack the CHSH inequality ceases to be violated. In
practice, Alice and Bob should (seldom but randomly) modify their mea-
surement, in order to check the violation of CHSH in a subsequent sifting
procedure. If the quantum channel allowed the violation, then they can ex-
tract a secure key; otherwise, they abort the protocol.
[25] C. S liwa, quant-ph/0305190; D. Collins and N. Gisin, quant-ph/0306129.
[26] K. Horodecki, M. Horodecki, P. Horodecki and J. Oppenheim,
quant-ph/0309110.
9
